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ABSTRACT
North Carolina is the only state never to have enacted a
certification procedure, which would allow federal courts, in
appropriate cases, to send questions of North Carolina law to the
North Carolina Supreme Court. Previous calls for certification’s
adoption in this state have been unsuccessful, perhaps because the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent seems to
undercut certification’s constitutionality. Reexamined in light of the
North Carolina Constitution’s design and the structure of the General
Court of Justice, however, this precedent does not render certification
unconstitutional. Even if the North Carolina Supreme Court holds to
the contrary, certification could be adopted by constitutional
amendment or under a theory that answering certified questions does
not require an exercise of jurisdiction. North Carolina therefore can
and should adopt certification. Such a procedure will avoid federal
court guesswork on difficult state law issues, ensuring fairness for the
litigants while saving time and money for future parties and the North
Carolina courts. Certification’s potential pitfalls can be circumvented
through careful drafting and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
conscientious use of discretion. Bearing principles of judicial
economy, comity, and federalism in mind, North Carolina should at
last join the rest of the union in adopting certification.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit confronted a knotty question of state
1
law. A Florida citizen, returning on a round-trip ticket purchased in
2
Florida, died when the plane crashed in Illinois. The court wrestled
with whether the Illinois wrongful death statute, which capped
3
damages, violated Florida public policy. What meager precedent
there was consisted of only automobile cases and conflicting authority
from other jurisdictions, and the academy was clamoring for
4
departure from traditional choice-of-law considerations. Ultimately,
the decision rested not on “ascertain[ing] what had been held,” but on
“divining the policy considerations which the Supreme Court of
5
Florida would now embrace.”
Stymied by such a “delicate choice,” the Fifth Circuit took
advantage of a Florida procedure allowing it to certify the question
before it to the Florida Supreme Court, which overruled itself to hold
6
the cap applicable. Receiving the state court’s reply, the Fifth Circuit
reflected on the certification procedure’s value:
For a Federal Court to have attempted to resolve the question on
its own would have been fraught with great hazard both to litigants
and the law. That is especially so since the Supreme Court out of a
single mass of materials reached at different times divergent results.
. . . [W]here Erie often compels the most speculative anticipation
on matters not yet decided, Florida’s procedure gives a clear,
positive, final decisive answer. It is not just a bright clear light
showing the Erie-way . . . . it is what the law actually is on the precise
point presented to us and certified for answer. It is Florida law
7
binding on us as we perform our Erie role.

1. See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins I), 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966).
2. Id. at 348.
3. Id. at 348–49.
4. Id. at 349.
5. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins II), 394 F.2d 656, 656–57 (5th Cir. 1968).
6. Id. The Florida Supreme Court first held, over dissent, that the Illinois damages cap did
not apply, Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins III), 201 So. 2d 743, 748 (Fla. 1967),
then reversed itself 4–3 on rehearing, holding the cap applicable, id. at 752.
7. Hopkins II, 394 F.2d at 657 (footnotes omitted).
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8

A certification procedure like the one just described authorizes a
9
federal court, under certain circumstances, to certify (that is, send)
questions of state law with which it is faced to the state’s highest
10
11
court. The state high court, if it so chooses, resolves the certified
question with the expectation that the parties will return to federal
12
court for further proceedings.
North Carolina remains the only state never to have enacted
13
14
such a procedure, putting it behind the District of Columbia,
15
16
17
Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. Previous
calls for certification’s adoption in North Carolina have been
18
19
unsuccessful. In a 1999 article, then-practitioner Jessica Smith

8. Like much of the literature, this Note employs “certification” as shorthand for
“interjurisdictional certification.” See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2007) (using the same convention). Intrajurisdictional
certification procedures, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2000), are beyond this Note’s scope.
9. Some certification procedures allow other states’ appellate courts to certify, as well.
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1A-3 (LexisNexis 2000) (allowing interstate certification).
The arguments for interstate certification parallel those for federal-state certification. For
convenience, this Note refers only to “federal courts.”
10. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18(a) (allowing federal courts to certify questions “which are
determinative of [the] cause” before that court when “there are no clear controlling
precedents”).
11. See, e.g., ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a) (“The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, answer
questions of law certified to it . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., id. 6-8(g) (“The written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law
governing the questions certified shall be sent . . . to the certifying court . . . .”).
13. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2002) (listing the thenexisting state certification procedures and concluding that only Arkansas, New Jersey, and
North Carolina had none). Arkansas and New Jersey have since adopted certification. See ARK.
CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8; N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A-1 to A-8. Note,
however, that Missouri’s certification procedure, MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West 2004), is
nonfunctional: the Missouri Supreme Court held that answering a certified question would be
unconstitutional, Grantham v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July
13, 1990) (en banc).
14. See D.C. CODE § 11-723 (2001); D.C. CT. APP. R. 22 (authorizing certification).
15. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 4, § 24s(f) (2003); P.R. SUP. CT. R. 23 (authorizing
certification).
16. See N. MAR. I. R. APP. P. 5, available at http://www.cnmilaw.org/pdf/court_rules/
R02.pdf (authorizing certification, adopted prior to 2004).
17. See GUAM R. APP. P. 20(b), available at http://www.guamsupremecourt.com/Rules/
images/GRAP%2002212007.pdf (authorizing certification, adopted in 2007).
18. See Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for
an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2125
(1999) (recommending that North Carolina adopt a certification procedure); see also JONA
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urged state lawmakers to create a certification procedure, concluding
20
that the North Carolina Constitution poses no bar. Unfortunately,
her analysis fails to account for the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
jurisdictional precedent, which prohibits the General Assembly from
enlarging the supreme court’s jurisdiction even though no such
21
prohibition appears in the North Carolina Constitution’s text. This
precedent poses an obstacle to certification’s adoption in North
Carolina.
That obstacle can be overcome. This Note takes the position that
North Carolina can and should adopt a certification procedure. Part I
lays out the case for certification, discussing how careful drafting and
the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion
can maximize certification’s benefits while avoiding pitfalls. Part II
analyzes the difficulties certification may face in North Carolina,
specifically the possibility that it violates the state constitution. Part
III offers strategies for implementing certification that circumvent
these constitutional problems and proposes features the certification
procedure should incorporate.
I. THE CASE FOR CERTIFICATION
Although North Carolina is the country’s last certification
holdout, bandwagon arguments alone should not dictate state policy.
This Part lays out a three-part case for why North Carolina should
adopt a certification procedure. Section A describes certification’s

GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 98 (1995)
(same); J. Donald Hobart, Jr., Note, Currie v. United States and the Elusive “Duty to Commit”
Dangerous Mental Patients: Conflicting Views of North Carolina Law from the Federal Courts,
66 N.C. L. REV. 1311, 1334 & n.162 (1988) (suggesting that certification, though difficult to
implement, would be superior to conflicting federal court interpretations of an unclear state
law). Although the North Carolina General Statutes Commission has had an open docket on
the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act for a number of years, it has never
recommended a certification statute to the General Assembly. Telephone Interview with P. Bly
Hall, Assistant Reviser of Statutes, N.C. Gen. Statutes Comm’n, in Durham, N.C. (Mar. 17,
2008).
19. Professor Smith joined the faculty of the North Carolina School of Government shortly
after publishing. See UNC School of Government – Faculty: Jessica Smith, http://www.sog.
unc.edu/about/directory/jsmith.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (listing the faculty member’s
starting date).
20. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–43 (analyzing the North Carolina Constitution but
not the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent).
21. See infra Part II.B.
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development as a solution to Erie’s problems and abstention’s
shortcomings. Section B details certification’s benefits to litigants, the
federal courts, and the North Carolina Courts. Section C explains
how North Carolina can avoid potential pitfalls through drafting and
the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion.
A. Erie’s Problems, Abstention, and Certification
Certification developed in this country in response to difficulties
22
arising out of the 1938 case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. Erie
demands that a federal court decide substantive state law questions
23
exactly as a state court would. Obeying Erie is straightforward if
24
state law is clear, but predicting how the state supreme court would
25
26
decide an unclear issue is neither easy nor value-free. For unsettled
issues implicating state policy, a federal court’s Erie-based prediction
27
creates “needless friction with [the] state.”
In response to this friction, the federal courts developed
28
doctrines of abstention. When it abstains, a federal court avoids
adjudicating a state law issue by sending the parties to state court to
29
obtain a declaratory judgment. This process has significant flaws.

22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Certification already existed in Britain
at the time. See J. Michael Medina, The Interjurisdictional Certification of Questions of Law
Experience: Federal, State, and Oklahoma—Should Arkansas Follow?, 45 ARK. L. REV. 99, 99–
100 (1992) (citing The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859, 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 63).
23. See, e.g., Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Tex., Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 785
n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court applies state law exactly as would a state court.” (citing
Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 64)), modified on other grounds, 207 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
24. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1467 (1997).
25. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2133 (“[T]he federal judge [must] consider, among other
things, the entire body of relevant state law, any pertinent trends bearing on the particular issue
before him, treatises, restatements, law review articles or other materials that he thinks the state
court might find persuasive, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions . . . .”).
26. See Clark, supra note 24, at 1469–71 (equating the policymaking judgments necessary
for deciding unclear legal questions with legislation); see also infra notes 50–51 and
accompanying text.
27. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) (instructing the district court
to refer the parties to state court for a declaratory judgment on state law in “avoidance of
needless friction with state policies”).
28. See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1959) (requiring
abstention on a state law issue that was “intimately involved with sovereign prerogative”);
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500–01 (requiring abstention as a matter of constitutional avoidance).
29. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4241 (describing the abstention doctrines).
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Foremost among these is “legendary” cost and delay: the parties must
leave federal court to initiate a full round of state litigation plus any
attendant appeals, and then return to federal court for another full
30
round of litigation and appeals. Moreover, the state supreme court
may not definitively resolve the relevant issue, as that court can
31
decline review—undercutting the reason to abstain in the first place.
Accordingly, many commentators have rejected abstention as
32
unacceptable.
Meanwhile, an alternative to abstention has evolved:
certification. Facing uncertain state law questions in Clay v. Sun
33
Insurance Office Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court seized upon Florida’s
little-known certification statute, suggesting that the court below
34
certify rather than abstain. The decision touched off a steady
movement toward consensus: the Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act appeared in 1967, to be adopted by eighteen states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico over the following twenty
35
years. Where state constitutions barred certification, states amended
36
their constitutions. Eventually, only Arkansas, New Jersey, and

30. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 591
(1977) (describing certification’s attendant cost and delay as “legendary”).
31. Id. at 604–05.
32. E.g., David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part II), 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (“[T]he delays and added cost of abstention . . . [are] too high a
price to pay . . . .”); Field, supra note 30, at 592 (“[T]he abstention procedure is not worth its
costs . . . .”).
33. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
34. See id. at 212 & n.3 (praising the Florida legislature’s “rare foresight” in creating the
procedure); see also Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism:
Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 381–82 (2000) (describing the
Florida certification statute and its nonuse at the time).
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to promote certification as a procedure that “in
the long run save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974); see also Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79–80 (1997) (recommending certification in a challenge to a
new state constitutional amendment); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1976)
(recommending certification in a challenge to an abortion statute).
35. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act note (1967) (Refs. and Annotations)
(listing jurisdictions that have adopted the act). As of 2007, this act had been adopted by twentyfour states. See id.; see also Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 67, 67 (1995)
(revising the 1967 act; adopted in seven states).
36. Utah’s procedure, for example, was initially deemed unconstitutional. See Holden v. N
L Indus., 629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981) (“[T]his Court has no jurisdiction to provide federal
courts the requested ruling on state law.”). In response, the state amended its constitution and
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37

North Carolina had never adopted a procedure. Arkansas amended
38
its constitution in 2000 and issued a certification rule; New Jersey
39
followed suit in 2003. North Carolina thus remains the only state
never to have implemented certification.
B. Certification’s Benefits
Scholars have documented certification’s benefits both
40
41
theoretically and empirically. As its most noticeable benefit, a
North Carolina certification procedure would relieve federal courts of
the necessity of predicting unsettled North Carolina law. This
avoidance is valuable for two reasons. First, it allocates legal
decisionmaking efficiently. On a novel issue, it is much more difficult
for a federal court to predict what the North Carolina Supreme Court
will find persuasive than for the supreme court simply to be
42
persuaded. Second, the federal court may incorrectly predict how the

reenacted the procedure. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (West 2007);
UTAH R. APP. P. 41. New York avoided a similar problem by amending its constitution before
enacting a certification statute. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 34, at 386–93 (describing the
history of the amendment). But cf. MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West 2007) (authorizing
certification); Grantham v. Mo. Dep’t. of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13,
1990) (en banc) (holding that the Missouri Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear certified
questions under the statute). No constitutional amendment appears to be pending in Missouri.
37. Cochran, supra note 13, at 159 n.13. Some U.S. territories, too, had not yet adopted
certification at that time, but have since done so. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
38. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3) (2000); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8 (adopted in 2002).
39. N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A refs. & annotations.
40. See Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19
GA. L. REV. 999, 1036, 1038 (1985) (discussing certification’s positivist underpinnings and the
notion of the state supreme court as the better decisionmaker); Gerald M. Levin, Note, InterJurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 344, 348, 350 (1963) (describing certification’s benefits over abstention in terms of
judicial economy and increased federal involvement in the state question’s resolution).
41. See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 53 (listing a score of benefits identified by federal
judges and state justices); John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and
Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 445–57 (1988) (reporting survey results from state and
federal judges indicating “overwhelming judicial support” for certification).
42. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 34, at 377 (“Whereas the highest court of the state
can ‘quite acceptably ride along a crest of common sense, avoiding the extensive citation of
authority,’ a federal court often must exhaustively dissect each piece of evidence thought to cast
light on what the highest state court would ultimately decide.” (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 142 (1973))).
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North Carolina Supreme Court would answer the question. An
incorrect guess deprives the present litigants of justice insofar as that
concept refers to accuracy of outcome, not merely procedural
44
fairness. It also hurts future litigants who adjust their out-of-court
behavior to conform to law that will not hold water when tested in the
45
North Carolina courts. Parties favored by a questionable federal
46
decision will engage in forum shopping (loathed by Erie ), while the
resulting uncertainty breeds, rather than eliminates, litigation.
In contrast, if the North Carolina Supreme Court hears the
47
question, its response will be definitive. Because the supreme court
is the final arbiter of state law, its decision will always be “correct”;
the parties are thus guaranteed as accurate an outcome as is possible.
The resulting state law uniformity will create certainty, which benefits
future parties (who know their rights) and the court system as a whole
48
(by reducing suits). This uniformity also fosters comity by affording
North Carolina judges control over the content of North Carolina
49
law. Resolving unsettled issues of state law requires value-laden

43. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2124–25 (describing federal courts’ incorrect predictions of
North Carolina law); see also John R. Brown, Certification—Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L.
REV. 455, 455 n.2 (1977) (listing some of the Fifth Circuit’s incorrect state law predictions);
Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (same in the Third Circuit).
44. But cf. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 677, 690 (1995) (dismissing this concern because “appellate review . . . does not guarantee
the ‘right’ answer—merely the last answer”). Respectfully, Judge Selya’s point is irrelevant.
Legal procedures should be tailored toward the best outcome regardless of whether litigants
have a right to it: that is why appellate judges hear arguments to make their determinations,
rather than flipping coins. The latter would be just as final, but not as just.
45. See William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and
Jurisprudential Reasons Why New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 491, 512 (1998) (“[T]ransaction costs . . . inevitably result when citizens of the
state attempt to conform their conduct . . . to the non-precedential opinion of a federal court.”).
46. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (listing the “discouragement of forumshopping” as one of Erie’s “twin aims”).
47. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of the Federal Courts to Certify
Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1698 (2003) (“[T]he state’s highest court [is]
the only court capable of rendering a ‘definitive’ statement of state law under Erie and its
progeny . . . .”).
48. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 512 (discussing certification’s “broad benefits
to future litigants” and “elimination of transaction costs”).
49. See Clark, supra note 24, at 1465 (“[C]ertification ensures that agents of the
state . . . resolve unsettled questions of state law.”).
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50

policymaking; state judges, immersed in this state’s social and legal
51
milieu and accountable to its citizens, should decide such issues.
Certification obtains this result without forcing the litigants to suffer
52
abstention’s cost and delay.
Perhaps the most important (though least recognized) benefit of
53
certification is that it is discretionary at both ends. A federal court
will certify only those questions of law that it feels are important
enough to merit the North Carolina Supreme Court’s attention and
uncertain enough to raise the specter of erroneous decision—a judge
54
confident of mastering the relevant law will not certify. Likewise, the
North Carolina Supreme Court may decline the question unless it
agrees that answering will serve judicial economy, comity, and
55
federalism.
C. How North Carolina Can Avoid Potential Pitfalls
56

Nonconstitutional criticisms of certification fall into three basic
categories: (1) delay for the parties, (2) state court congestion, and (3)
57
piecemeal or abstract opinions. North Carolina can sidestep each of

50. Id. at 1469–71.
51. LeBel, supra note 40, at 1038.
52. See Medina, supra note 22, at 103 (describing certification as a means to achieve
abstention’s purpose without its problems). Another benefit of certification over abstention is
that certification preserves federal fact finding and issue framing—assuaging some concerns
about forum fairness—rather than relegating out-of-state litigants entirely to state court. See,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606 (West 2008) (requiring the certifying court to
find the underlying facts and frame the questions for review).
53. See, e.g., ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a)(1) (“The Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
answer questions of law certified to it . . . .”). Certification appears to remain discretionary even
if couched in “mandatory” terms. Compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West
2008) (“[T]he supreme court shall render its opinion in answer [to a properly certified
question].” (emphasis added)), with Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, A.G., 10 P.3d 371, 374
(Wash. 2000) (“[W]hether to answer a certified question . . . is within the discretion of the
court.”).
54. See, e.g., State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1195 (N.D. Ala. 1987)
(“[T]he judge who is here sitting is thoroughly persuaded by his 31 years of trial and appellate
practice in the Alabama courts . . . that he can reasonably predict the opinion and holding of
Alabama’s highest court . . . .”).
55. Cf. CONN. R. APP. P. § 82-3 (requiring the certified question’s determination to be “in
the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action”).
56. Unlike these superficial criticisms, certification’s constitutional difficulties in North
Carolina are genuine. This Note addresses them infra in Part II.
57. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 509–10 (identifying the same categories).
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these concerns through careful drafting and the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion.
First, a North Carolina certification procedure will not force
federal litigants to endure undue delay. One study indicated that
federal courts of appeals waited a mean of 6.6 months for the answer
58
to a certified question, and district courts waited 8.2 months. Not all
of that time is delay, as regardless of whether certification is
employed the parties must brief and argue the issue and some court
59
must decide it and draft an opinion. The relatively small delay from
certification reflects a tradeoff between fairness and efficiency: time
in exchange for an authoritative ruling on a difficult issue. Any
residual disadvantage to the parties will be offset by the benefit that
60
settled law brings to future parties and future courts.
In addition, North Carolina can avoid unproductive delay
through careful drafting. A few litigants have had to wait for some
61
time merely to find out that a certified question was declined. This
problem can be avoided by drafting a time limit into the certification
procedure. For example, the Arkansas certification rule specifies that
a certified question be rejected by default if the Arkansas Supreme
62
Court does not accept the question within thirty days. Other states
63
have chosen different time limits. Learning from these states’
experience, North Carolina should protect parties from unnecessary
delay by including a timing provision in its procedure.

58. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 42. By contrast, the median disposition time for
federal cases in 2006, from filing in the lower court to appellate decision, was 27.5 months.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 125 tbl.B-4A (2006).
59. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 512. Sometimes certification may reduce the
decision time on a state law issue. For example, if a federal district court were to certify the
question of whether the plaintiff stated a claim under state law, the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s answer would render an appeal on that issue unnecessary.
60. See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 109 (“[T]he savings in costs and time to future
litigants . . . greatly outweigh [the] additional costs . . . incurred by litigants in a single
certification case.”).
61. See Selya, supra note 44, at 681 (lamenting the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s
decision not to answer a series of certified questions after a delay of “some two to three years”).
62. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a)(2)–(3). The acceptance period can be extended by order. Id.
63. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-222 (2007) (sixty days); S.C. R. APP. P. 228(c) (forty-five
days).
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Second, certified questions will not overrun North Carolina’s
64
“under-funded and overstretched court system.” Federal judges take
their jurisdiction seriously, regarding certification as a “valuable
resource” to be preserved, not a “panacea . . . . to be used as a
65
convenient way to duck [the court’s] responsibility.” The U.S.
Supreme Court has implied that the difficulty of predicting state law
66
is insufficient, by itself, to allow certification. A federal court should
67
therefore certify only if the question (1) is dispositive, (2) cannot be
68
determined from precedent, and (3) implicates some matter of
69
North Carolina policy. If other Fourth Circuit states’ experiences are
an indication, the North Carolina Supreme Court will receive one to
70
four questions per year. Should answering these questions prove too
71
burdensome, the supreme court can decline to do so for lack of time.
The North Carolina Supreme Court should also use its discretion
to winnow out certified questions that do not merit its time and
attention. If a federal court certifies banal questions of law or
questions that are too factually specific to be of broad significance,
64. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FISCAL YEAR 2005-06 ANNUAL REPORT: THE
NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH 19, available at http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/
Publications/Documents/annualreport_2005-06.pdf.
65. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). Another judge contemplated his discretion to certify as follows:
Prudent exercise of this discretion is important. All certifying courts should be keenly
aware of their obligation not to abdicate their responsibility to decide issues properly
before them. They should also be keenly aware that certification involves an
imposition on the time and resources of the Supreme Court of [the State] and an
increase in the expenditure of time and resources by the parties . . . . In appropriate
cases it is the “best solution,” but [not] every case . . . [is] an appropriate case.
W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wight, 673 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Va. 1987) (footnote
omitted).
66. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974) (discussing certification and
noting that “mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse” for abdicating jurisdiction).
67. See John D. Butzner, Jr., & Mary Nash Kelly, Certification: Assuring the Primacy of
State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449, 453 (1985) (describing the Fourth
Circuit’s prudential limits on certifying).
68. Id.
69. See Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390–91 (suggesting, because state law difficulty alone is
insufficient, that some comity interest must be present to justify certification).
70. From 1990 to 1994 inclusive, the high courts of South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia received seven, four, and eighteen certification requests, respectively. (West Virginia
was the second highest in the nation.) GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 34–35 tbl.6. Nationally,
high courts answered a mean of 6.6 questions each over those five years. Id.
71. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2146 (“[I]f the certification procedure . . . is discretionary,
[the] court will always have a means to control its caseload . . . .”).
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the benefit to North Carolina will be insubstantial. Even some
significant questions, such as intricate applications of state
constitutional law, might be decided better on full factual records
72
developed by North Carolina’s state courts. Accordingly, the North
Carolina Supreme Court should decline any certified question that, in
73
its determination, does not appreciably further state interests. It
should also set forth its reasons for so concluding in a short, per
74
curiam opinion to serve as a guide for future certifying courts. This
conscientious use of discretion will encourage certification only when
it is worthwhile.
Third, a properly drafted certification procedure would not force
the North Carolina Supreme Court to decide cases piecemeal, or
worse, to decide abstract questions of law without underlying facts.
By definition, a certified question emerges from a controversy already
justiciable before an Article III court. The question therefore arises
out of sufficient operative facts; North Carolina’s procedure can
require the certifying court to supply them. For comparison,
Virginia’s procedure requires the certifying order to state the certified
question and the nature of the controversy in which it arises, a
statement of all relevant facts, and an explanation of how the certified
75
question is determinative of the pending case. If the parties dispute
the facts, the certifying court can be compelled to determine the facts
76
before certifying. Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court
can require the certifying court to provide the entire record from

72. See Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified
Questions a Good Idea or a Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 351 (2004) (worrying that
certification will “dilute the quality” of constitutional adjudication because “[c]onstitutional
issues are especially fact sensitive”).
73. See, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 170 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (declining
to answer certified questions of fact or that require factual determinations); Yesil v. Reno, 705
N.E.2d 655, 656 (N.Y. 1998) (declining to answer certified questions pertaining to immigration
because that issue was better left to federal courts); Grabois v. Jones, 667 N.E.2d 307, 307 (N.Y.
1996) (declining to answer a certified question because the issue was unlikely to recur); Rufino
v. United States, 506 N.E.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. 1987) (declining to answer a certified question on
the same subject as an appeal pending in the state system).
74. The New York cases cited in supra note 73 are excellent examples of this practice.
75. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42(c) (setting forth the requirements for a certification order).
76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606(b) (West 2008) (“If the parties
cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts
and state them as a part of its certification order.”).
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77

below or any portion thereof. The supreme court may also retain the
right to reformulate the question if it determines that the certifying
78
court confused or misstated the legal issues. Finally, if the question
remains too abstract despite these tools, the North Carolina Supreme
79
Court may decline the question.
In sum, a well-drafted and -executed certification procedure
would serve North Carolina well, if the state can implement it. The
following Part of this Note examines the constitutional difficulties
such a procedure faces in North Carolina. The final Part proposes
ways to sidestep those difficulties so that North Carolina may finally
get on the certification bandwagon.
II. CERTIFICATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH
CAROLINA
Implementing certification in North Carolina raises two
constitutional questions. First, would certification require the North
Carolina Supreme Court to render impermissible advisory opinions?
Second, does that court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
certified questions? After a brief description of North Carolina’s
drafting options, Sections A and B address these questions in turn.
80
81
Certification procedures can be created via court rule, statute,
82
or both. The North Carolina Constitution requires that the North
Carolina Supreme Court supply a rule for some of certification’s
procedural aspects, but the General Assembly may statutorily

77. See, e.g., id. § 12-605(b) (“[The High Court] of this State may require the certifying
court to deliver all or part of its record . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., id. § 12-604 (“The [High Court] of this State may reformulate a question of
law certified to it.”). To avoid issuing an advisory opinion, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should solicit the certifying court’s input when reformulating a question. See
infra Part II.A.
79. Cf., e.g., Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 548 So. 2d 146, 146 (Ala. 1989) (declining to
answer an abstract certified question without underlying facts); Willis v. Ga. Power Co., 174 S.E.
625, 626 (Ga. 1934) (declining to answer a certified question due to overbreadth); Eley v. Pizza
Hut of Am., 500 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Iowa 1993) (declining to answer a certified question based on
conflicting facts).
80. Cf., e.g., S.C. R. APP. PRAC. 228 (implementing certification via court rule).
81. Cf., e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1A-1 to -13 (West 2007) (implementing certification
via statute).
82. Cf., e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -613 (West 2007); MD. R. 8305 (implementing certification via court rule and statute).
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implement the aspects of certification not governed by the state
constitution. The North Carolina Constitution creates a unified
General Court of Justice within the state, consisting of Appellate,
83
Superior Court, and District Court Divisions. Only the North
Carolina Supreme Court may prescribe procedural rules for the
84
85
Appellate Division, of which it is a part. The North Carolina
Supreme Court must therefore supply a rule for the procedure that it
would follow when answering certified questions. On the other hand,
the General Assembly can regulate when federal courts may send
questions, as this would prescribe procedure for federal courts, not
86
for the North Carolina Supreme Court. The General Assembly
might also be able to prescribe the criteria by which the North
Carolina Supreme Court would decide whether to answer, by analogy
to the General Assembly’s power to prescribe the criteria by which
the North Carolina Supreme Court decides whether to grant
87
discretionary review. These drafting options are important to keep
in mind when considering the constitutional questions below, for the

83. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
84. See id. art. IV, § 13(2) (“The Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make
rules of procedure . . . for the Appellate Division.”).
85. See id. art. IV, § 5 (“The Appellate Division . . . shall consist of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals.”).
86. Think of certification as a process consisting of two parts: (1) a federal court sends a
question and (2) the North Carolina Supreme Court accepts it for review. Logically, a rule
governing when federal courts may send questions, but not when the supreme court may accept,
prescribes procedure only for the federal courts. Under a constitutional theory explored infra
Part II.B, the General Assembly can create a certification procedure for federal courts even if it
could not prescribe when the North Carolina Supreme could answer. In brief, the reasoning
proceeds as follows:
The power to create a certification procedure for federal courts is not mentioned in the
North Carolina Constitution. See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2) (describing the judicial and
legislative rulemaking powers). Under prevailing doctrine, the General Assembly may pass any
statute not prohibited by the constitution, but may not enlarge the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction. See infra Part II.B. The General Assembly can therefore create a
certification procedure unless it would enlarge the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
So long as the statute does not govern when the supreme court shall answer certified questions,
it does not affect that court’s jurisdiction and is thus constitutional. For a full explanation of the
constitutional theory and precedent behind this reasoning, see infra Part II.B.
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31 (West 2007) (permitting the supreme court to
review decisions of significant public interest or legal significance or that conflict with its
precedent). The General Assembly’s power to pass such a statute depends upon whether the
North Carolina Supreme Court has jurisdiction over certified questions. See infra Parts II.B,
III.A.
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certification procedure’s constitutionality may turn on which branch
88
of government adopts it.
A. Advisory Opinions
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that its opinions
89
cannot merely be advisory. Certification raises concerns about
advisory opinions for two reasons: (1) a certified question arises in a
case pending in a court of another jurisdiction, and (2) the answering
court decides the question with the expectation that the parties will
return to the certifying court.
These concerns are unjustified. Certified questions are unlike
90
advisory opinions in all other relevant respects. A certified question
arises out of a bona fide case or controversy justiciable before an
Article III court; the parties fully brief and argue the question to nest
91
it within a concrete factual setting. Certification therefore “bears the
hallmarks of the adversarial system and the purported benefits that
92
follow.” Unlike an advisory opinion, the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision would have res judicata and stare decisis effect and
93
constitute binding law on the present and all future parties.
88. For a discussion of whether the General Assembly may constitutionally enlarge the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, see infra Part II.B. For an examination of whether
the North Carolina Supreme Court can exercise the people’s reserved powers, see infra Part
III.B.
89. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (N.C. 1985) (“The North Carolina
Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions.”). To
be non-advisory, an opinion must potentially affect an actual dispute between adverse litigants.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (insisting that a case is
not justiciable in the “absence of a genuine adversary issue between the parties”). As discussed
in this Section, answers to certified questions are not advisory opinions because they may
determine a federal litigant's claim. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
90. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 521–22 (“The features of advisory opinions
that make them objectionable . . . are not present in the certification procedure proposed . . . .”).
91. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2139 (describing how these concerns persuaded the Maine
Supreme Court to hold that certified questions are nonadvisory).
92. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 522.
93. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(f) (“The answer to the certified questions shall be res
judicata as to the parties and have the same precedential force as any other appellate decision of
the supreme court.”); S.C. R. APP. PRAC. 228(f) (“The decision shall be accorded the same force
and effect as any other decision of the Supreme Court . . . .”). Such language renders the answer
to a certified question binding in all U.S. jurisdictions. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (“[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
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Moreover, certified questions do not implicate the separation-ofpowers concerns plaguing advisory opinions. Certification would not
encourage the North Carolina Supreme Court to encroach upon the
realm of the General Assembly. In adjudicating adverse parties’
rights on the facts of a single case, the answering court performs a
94
quintessentially judicial function —consider, for example, how out of
place it would be for a federal court to certify a question to the state
legislature. To the extent that the North Carolina Supreme Court
“interferes” with anyone by answering the question, it interferes with
the certifying court; yet this interference is a fulfillment, not an
infringement, of federalist principles. When interpreting North
Carolina law, a federal court is supposed to be subordinate, not
95
coordinate, to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Finally, certified questions are more than advisory because they
are dispositive. Under the Uniform Law, a properly certified question
96
is one that may be determinative of the claim. The North Carolina
Supreme Court’s answer, like its ruling on any dispositive motion, has
the potential to foreclose at least one claim or defense within the
97
case. If the supreme court discovers that a certified question cannot

such State . . . from which they are taken.”). The answer to a certified question is nonadvisory
because of this binding effect, much as a monetary judgment against a party with no in-state
assets is nonadvisory because of its binding effect in other states. Cf., e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 175.4(5)(a) (West 2007) (granting North Carolina courts long-arm jurisdiction over claims arising
from promises “to pay for services to be performed in th[e] State”); Blue Ridge Health
Investors, LLC v. Mars Syst, Inc., No. COA04-1248, 2005 WL 1578391, at *2–3 (N.C. Ct. App.
July 5, 2005) (exercising jurisdiction under § 1-75.4(5)(a) despite the defendant’s apparent lack
of in-state assets).
94. As one Michigan Supreme Court Justice convincingly argued:
When an actual controversy exists between parties, it is submitted in formal
proceedings to a court, the decision of the court is binding upon the parties and their
privies and is res adjudicata [sic] of the issue in any other proceedings . . . what else
can the decision be but the exercise of judicial power?
Melson v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, 696 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., dissenting
from a decision to answer a certified question) (quoting Wash.-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore,
229 N.W. 618, 680–81 (1930)).
95. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (making state courts’ decisions
binding on federal courts when state law supplies the rule of decision).
96. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 67, 73 (1995) (“The
[Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it . . . which may be determinative of
the cause . . . .”).
97. See W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630 (Or. 1991)
(interpreting “may be determinative” to “mean[] that our decision must, in one or more of the
forms it could take, have the potential to determine at least one claim in the case”). For

2008]

CERTIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

85

98

be determinative, it should decline to answer. For this reason, most
states consider certification a proper exercise of the judicial power,
99
not an advisory opinion.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly grant the
North Carolina Supreme Court jurisdiction over certified questions.
Nevertheless, in her 1999 article, Jessica Smith examined North
Carolina law and concluded that the state could constitutionally enact
100
a certification procedure. She looked first to the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional clause, which states:
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal
any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal
inference. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over “issues of
fact” and “questions of fact” shall be the same exercised by it prior
to the adoption of this Article, and the Court may issue any
remedial writs necessary to give it general supervision and control
over the proceedings of the other courts. The Supreme Court also
has jurisdiction to review, when authorized by law, direct appeals
from a final order or decision of the North Carolina Utilities
101
Commission.

example, consider the question, “Has the plaintiff stated a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED)?” If the state court refuses to recognize NIED, the plaintiff’s claim
will fail. Thus the question is dispositive notwithstanding the fact that, if the court recognizes
NIED and defines its elements, the plaintiff may or may not be able to make out those elements
at trial.
98. See, e.g., Union Planters Bank v. People of the State of New York, No. 1050562, 2008
WL 274756, at *2–4 (Ala. Feb. 1, 2008) (declining to answer certified questions for lack of
determinativity); Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 2008) (declining to answer a
certified question for mootness); Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 184 P.3d 463, 467 (Okla. 2007)
(declining to answer certified questions because the certifying court possibly lacked
jurisdiction).
99. Corr & Robbins, supra note 41, at 422. But compare Melson, 696 N.W.2d at 687
(Young, J., concurring) (arguing that answers to certified questions are advisory opinions), with
id. at 692–702 (Markman, J., dissenting) (rebutting Justice Young’s argument in detail).
100. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–43 (discussing the North Carolina Constitution, but
not the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent); see also GOLDSCHMIDT,
supra note 18, at 98 (acknowledging that precedent but suggesting that certification would be
constitutional).
101. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1).
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This provision says nothing about interjurisdictional
102
Under prevailing constitutional theory, a state
certification.
constitution is not a power-granting, but a power-limiting document:
any power not prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution’s
provisions is reserved to the people, and the people may exercise
103
their power through their elected representatives. Because the
104
constitution is ambiguous as to answering certified questions, the
argument runs, that power was reserved to the people and a
105
Other states
certification procedure may validly be enacted.
adopting this theory, including Florida, Washington, and Idaho, have
106
found certification constitutional. Using similar reasoning, Smith
concluded that North Carolina could constitutionally enact a
107
certification procedure.
Although correct in many respects, Smith’s analysis suffers from
two defects: (1) it misses a possible peculiarity of North Carolina’s
constitutional theory, and (2) it fails to consider the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent. First, although the
108
constitution-as-limit theory is entrenched in North Carolina law, it is

102. See id. (delimiting the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without regard to
certification).
103. Smith, supra note 18, at 2141 (quoting Baker v. Martin, 410 S.E.2d 887, 891 (N.C.
1991)). After citing North Carolina law for this principle, however, Smith next cites the Florida
Supreme Court’s formulation, which explicitly refers to judicial power. See id. at 2142 (“[A]ll
sovereign power, including the judicial power, not limited by a state constitution inheres to the
people . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla.
1961))). Significantly, the North Carolina formulation does not mention the judicial power. See
Baker, 410 S.E.2d at 891 (“All power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State
Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their representatives in
the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution.” (emphasis added)).
104. One other provision may also bear on this question: the separation-of-powers section of
the article on the judicial power. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall
have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully
pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize
any courts other than as permitted by this Article.”). Certification does not establish any new
court and grants, rather than removes, Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thus, this provision does not
facially apply, and Smith’s analysis proceeds. The North Carolina Supreme Court, affords the
policies behind this provision great weight, however. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
105. Smith, supra note 18, at 2141.
106. See id. at 2141–42 & nn.139–40 (citing examples from these states).
107. Id. at 2143.
108. See In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (N.C. 1997) (citing the theory to State ex rel.
Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989)). But the theory is much older:
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always formulated to grant the legislature, not the courts, the power
109
to exercise the people’s reserved rights. Second, as discussed in the
remainder of this Section, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
precedent prohibits the General Assembly from enlarging the
supreme court’s jurisdiction even though no such limitation appears
in the North Carolina Constitution’s text. If only the General
Assembly may exercise the people’s reserved power, but it may not
do so to enlarge the supreme court’s jurisdiction, Smith’s argument
110
fails.
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent,
beginning with North Carolina Utilities Commission v. Old Fort
111
Finishing Plant, undercuts Smith’s attempt to apply the constitutionas-limit theory to the adoption of certification. In 1963, the General
Assembly enacted a law creating a direct appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court from decisions of the North Carolina
112
Utilities Commission. Entertaining the first such appeal in Old Fort,
113
the supreme court struck down the law as unconstitutional. Article
IV of the North Carolina Constitution had been rewritten in 1962 to
vest the judicial power of the state in three loci: the General Court of
Justice, a court for the Trial of Impeachments, and administrative
114
agencies. A concurrent amendment gave the North Carolina
[S]tate Constitutions are not to be construed as grants of power . . . but rather as
limitations upon the power of the state Legislature.
. . . Consequently, the Legislature of a state may lawfully enact any law, of any
character, on any subject, unless it is prohibited, in the particular instance, either
expressly or by necessary implication, by the Constitution of the United States or by
that of the state, or unless it improperly invades the separate province of one of the
other departments of the government . . . .
State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 602 (N.C. 1906) (quoting BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS §§ 100–
01); see also State v. Matthews, 48 N.C. 451, 452–53 (1856) (“With the exception of the
powers surrendered to the United States, each State is absolutely sovereign. With the exception
of the restraints imposed by the Constitution of the State and the Bill of Rights, all legislative
power is vested in the General Assembly.”).
109. See sources cited supra notes 103 and 108.
110. Compare this argument with infra Part III.B, which analyzes whether the supreme
court can exercise reserved powers.
111. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1965).
112. See id. at 9 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-99).
113. Id. at 13.
114. The rewritten provisions read:
Section 1. . . . The judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Section 3
of this Article, be vested in a court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General
Court of Justice. . . .
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Supreme Court “jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of
115
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.” The
supreme court reasoned that the North Carolina Constitution
distinguished administrative agencies from the courts of the General
Court of Justice and therefore administrative agencies were not
116
courts. Because the North Carolina Supreme Court had appellate
jurisdiction only over decisions of the “courts below,” it could not
review the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s decisions on direct
117
appeal. Nor did the General Assembly have the power to create
118
such an appeal. In short, to provide for the direct appeal to the
supreme court, the Assembly had to amend the North Carolina
119
Constitution.
Ten years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered
120
its constitutional jurisdiction in Smith v. State. In Smith, a public
employee sued the state in a superior court for wrongful discharge,
121
claiming breach of an employment contract. On appeal, although no
party had raised the issue of original jurisdiction, the Smith court
examined the validity of General Statute Section 7A-25—granting the
supreme court original jurisdiction over claims against the state—in
122
light of a then-recent constitutional amendment. Historically, the
North Carolina Constitution contained a clause granting the North
....
Sec[tion] 3. . . . The General Assembly may vest in
agencies . . . such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary . . . .

administrative

See id. at 11–12 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3).
115. Id. at 12 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 10(1) (1962), amended and
renumbered § 12(1) by N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1258 (1969)).
116. See id. (“Administrative agencies referred to in Section 3 of Article IV ex vi termini are
distinguished from courts.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 12–13. The other provisions in the newly amended Article IV were of no help.
Sections 10(4) and 10(5), both quoted in Old Fort, permitted the Assembly to waive
jurisdictional limits in civil cases and to provide a proper system of appeals. Id. at 12 (quoting
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §§ 10(4)–(5) (1962), renumbered §§ 12(4)–(5) by N.C. Sess. Laws,
ch. 1258 (1969)). The supreme court did not address the former and dismissed the latter:
“Obviously, [Section 10(5)] refers to a system of appeals from a lower court to a higher court
within the General Court of Justice.” Id.
119. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to
review . . . direct appeals from a . . . decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.”).
120. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1976).
121. Id. at 414, 416.
122. Id. at 426–27.
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123

Carolina Supreme Court such jurisdiction. But a 1971 amendment
to that provision removed the clause, leaving the surrounding
124
material unchanged. Interpreting this amendment as divesting it of
original jurisdiction over claims against the state, the Smith court
concluded that Section 7A-25 had been implicitly repealed by the
125
amendment.
126
The Smith court also opined that Section 7A-25, if not
repealed, would be unconstitutional: “[W]hen the jurisdiction of a
particular court is constitutionally defined, the legislature cannot by
statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless authorized to do so
by the constitution. This principle is grounded on the separation of
127
powers provisions found in many American constitutions . . . .” On
these separation-of-powers grounds, the Smith court interpreted Old
Fort to hold that the General Assembly may not extend the supreme
128
court’s appellate jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits. Section
7A-25 was unconstitutional because, in light of the 1971 amendment,
the General Assembly no longer had authority to confer original
129
jurisdiction on the North Carolina Supreme Court. The supreme
court’s jurisdiction was therefore “limited ‘to review upon appeal any
decision of the courts below upon any matter of law or legal
130
inference.’”
131
Finally, in In re Martin, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reaffirmed Smith’s interpretation of its jurisdictional clause, but
allowed the Assembly to create a new type of appeal to the supreme

123. Id. at 425–26.
124. Id. at 426.
125. Id. at 428.
126. Because neither party had cited Section 7A-25 and the supreme court had already held
the statute to be repealed, its alternative constitutional holding must be dictum.
127. Id. at 428–29. The Smith court’s interpretation is reasonable: the North Carolina
Constitution contains an explicit Separation of Powers clause. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The
legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever
separate and distinct from each other.”). In addition, the opening section of the North Carolina
Constitution’s judiciary article reiterates the same concerns. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The
General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or
jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor
shall it establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this Article.”).
128. Smith, 222 S.E.2d at 429.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1)).
131. In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766 (N.C. 1978).
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132

court when constitutionally authorized. In 1972, the electorate
ratified an amendment to the North Carolina Constitution requiring
the General Assembly to create a nonimpeachment method for the
133
removal of incapacitated judges. The Assembly responded by
creating a commission to field removal actions, the decisions of which
134
would be reviewed directly by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Judge Martin challenged the act as unconstitutional, arguing that the
supreme court’s jurisdictional clause contained no provision for such
an appeal and, under Smith and Old Fort, the Assembly had no
135
authority to extend the court’s jurisdiction. The Martin court
confirmed that the Assembly may not expand the supreme court’s
jurisdiction without constitutional authorization, but held that the
136
new amendment provided such authorization. The Assembly could
appropriately select the North Carolina Supreme Court as the venue
for review because of the supreme court’s general supervisory
137
authority over the state courts.
The statute was therefore
138
constitutional.
These three cases create a regime under which the North
Carolina Supreme Court may hear all, but only, those types of cases
provided for in the text of the North Carolina Constitution. Despite
the general conception of the North Carolina Constitution as a
power-limiting document, the General Assembly is bound by the
constitutional text when providing access to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. Therefore, if the supreme court determines that it
does not have jurisdiction to answer certified questions from federal
courts, precedent prohibits the General Assembly from granting such
139
jurisdiction to the supreme court by statute. Unfortunately, this
precedent undermines Smith’s argument that, absent a limitation in

132. Id. at 770–71. Thus Martin converted Smith’s dicta into controlling law. See id. at 770
(“[D]iscussing the jurisdiction of this Court, we held, in Smith v. State, . . . that the Supreme
Court no longer had original jurisdiction over claims against the State . . . .” (emphasis added)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 769–70.
135. Id. at 770.
136. Id. at 770–71.
137. Id. at 771.
138. Id. at 772.
139. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976) (“[T]he General Assembly [is]
without authority to expand the appellate jurisdiction of [the North Carolina Supreme Court]
beyond the limits set in the Constitution.”).
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the North Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly may validly
enact a certification law.
III. STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CERTIFICATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA
As the previous Part explains, for a certification statute to be
constitutional, the North Carolina Supreme Court must interpret its
jurisdictional clause to include answering certified questions. At first
glance, the precedent described in Part II.B cuts against this
interpretation. Section A of this Part reexamines that precedent in
light of the North Carolina Constitution’s design, the structure of the
General Court of Justice, and separation-of-powers concerns to
suggest that the North Carolina Supreme Court does, in fact, have
jurisdiction to answer certified questions. In the event that the
supreme court holds to the contrary, the remaining three Sections
offer alternative strategies for implementing certification. Section B
considers whether the North Carolina Supreme Court, as opposed to
the General Assembly, can exercise the people’s reserved powers to
extend its own jurisdiction. Section C explores a theory, adopted by
some states, that the supreme court need not exercise jurisdiction
over a certified question to answer it. Section D, as a final measure,
proposes a constitutional amendment.
A. The N.C. Supreme Court Has Jurisdiction to Answer Certified
Questions
The North Carolina Constitution grants the North Carolina
Supreme Court jurisdiction “to review upon appeal any decision of
140
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.” In
light of the supreme court’s precedent, this provision poses three
obstacles to certification. First, federal courts (though clearly
“courts”) may not be “courts below”—that is, not lower courts in the
141
General Court of Justice. Second, certification may not be an
“appeal,” placing it outside the North Carolina Supreme Court’s

140. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1).
141. Cf. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C.
1965) (“[T]he appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court relates solely to appeals from
decisions of ‘the courts below’ . . . .”).
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142

“appellate jurisdiction.” Third, because a court certifies a question
in lieu of determining it, certification may not be a “decision” of a
143
court below suitable for review.
A certification procedure can overcome all of these obstacles.
First, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s precedent limiting its
jurisdiction to “the courts below” is inapposite. Second, certification
meets the other jurisdiction requirements because it strongly
resembles discretionary appellate review and the decision to certify
rests on a “matter of law or legal inference.” Third, the design of the
North Carolina Constitution and structure of the General Court of
Justice suggest that the North Carolina Supreme Court can answer
certified questions. Finally, the separation-of-powers policies
motivating the North Carolina Supreme Court’s previous, narrow
interpretation of its jurisdictional clause are inapplicable to
certification. For these reasons, the North Carolina Supreme Court
should hold that it has jurisdiction to answer certified questions and
either allow the General Assembly to enact a certification statute or
adopt a certification rule on its own motion.
1. Distinguishing Precedent. The North Carolina Supreme
Court’s precedent limiting its jurisdiction to appeals from “the courts
below” is inapplicable to certification. As discussed in Part II.B, the
Smith court held that a constitutional amendment had excised the
constitutional language granting the court original jurisdiction over
claims against the state, but otherwise had left the relevant provision
144
unchanged. The drafters’ conscious removal of that language
145
stripped the supreme court of its original jurisdiction. In contrast,
certification has never been mentioned in the North Carolina

142. Cf. id. (limiting the supreme court’s jurisdiction to “appeals from . . . ‘the courts below’”
(emphasis added)). The Court might consider certification to be original jurisdiction, cf. ARK.
CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3) (“The Supreme Court shall have . . . [o]riginal jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States . . . .”), or it might
consider certification to be sui generis, distinct from both original and appellate jurisdiction, cf.
Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the Ohio
Supreme Court “need[s] no grant of jurisdiction in order to answer certified questions” because
that power “exists by virtue of Ohio’s very existence as a state in our federal system”).
143. Cf. Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 12 (limiting jurisdiction to appeals from “decisions” of the
courts below).
144. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 425–26 (N.C. 1976).
145. Id. at 428.
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Constitution. There is no evidence that the drafters intentionally
denied the North Carolina Supreme Court the power to hear certified
questions; they probably never contemplated it. If the supreme court
has jurisdiction to hear certified questions, that jurisdiction remains;
no constitutional amendment removed it.
Old Fort is more on point. In Old Fort, the General Assembly
attempted to create a direct appeal from administrative agencies to
146
the North Carolina Supreme Court. But because administrative
agencies were distinguished from courts in the North Carolina
Constitution’s text, those agencies could not be “courts” below the
supreme court under the language of that court’s jurisdictional
147
clause. The North Carolina Constitution’s explicit distinction of
administrative agencies from courts proved that it did not authorize
the North Carolina Supreme Court to hear appeals from
administrative agencies.
Conversely, the North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly
distinguish federal courts from state courts; it does not mention
federal courts at all. Unlike administrative agencies, federal courts are
(as their name and operation show) “courts.” The sole question is
whether they are “below” the N.C. Supreme Court. Erie commands
that federal courts, when deciding North Carolina law, attempt to
148
predict what the North Carolina Supreme Court would hold. They
are subordinate to the North Carolina Supreme Court, bound by its
149
decisions just like any state court. Certification’s sole purpose is to
alleviate problems arising from federal courts’ subservience to the
North Carolina Supreme Court. Federal courts should therefore be
considered “courts below.”
2. Other Jurisdictional Limits. Certification also satisfies the
“appeal” and “decision” requirements. First, like an appeal, a
certified question arises out of a case or controversy in an inferior
146. Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 9.
147. Id. at 12.
148. See, e.g., Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Tex., Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 785
n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court applies state law exactly as would a state court.” (citing
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938))), modified on other grounds, 207 F.3d 225
(5th Cir. 2000).
149. Perhaps one could say the same thing about state administrative agencies. But Old Fort
did not hold that these agencies were not “below” the Supreme Court, it held that they were not
“courts below.” Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
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court, and the inferior court finds all of the relevant facts. The
North Carolina Supreme Court would determine whether to answer
the question in a manner similar to granting discretionary appellate
152
review. The subject matter of a certified question, a dispositive
question of state law, falls within the supreme court’s normal scope of
153
appellate review—“any matter of law or legal inference.” These
similarities have led other states to consider certification an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
154
adopted a certification rule even though its constitutional authority
155
extends only to “appellate jurisdiction in the last resort.” The North
Carolina Supreme Court should similarly interpret “appeals” to
include certified questions.
Second, the “decision” requirement is very lax. The supreme
court emphasized in 2005 that “decision” refers to “any decision of
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference”—in that
156
case, a trial judge’s order in a declaratory judgment action. If the
supreme court is true to its word, the decision to certify ought to be
enough: it requires a legal judgment as to whether the question meets
157
certification’s requirements. Because this is a decision on a “matter
150. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2139 (noting that “the parties are before the court and are
given the opportunity to present briefs and oral arguments,” so “it is clear that there is a
germane live controversy pending in the federal court which will be decided”).
151. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring
the certifying court to determine the relevant facts before certifying).
152. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
153. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review
upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.”).
154. N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A (authorizing certification).
155. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. New Jersey is not unusual in this respect. See, e.g., MISS.
CONST. art. VI, § 146 (granting the Mississippi Supreme Court “such jurisdiction as properly
belongs to a court of appeals); MISS. R. APP. P. 20 (allowing certified questions); W. VA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3 (granting the West Virginia Supreme Court, inter alia, such “appellate
jurisdiction . . . as may be prescribed by law”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1A (West 2007)
(allowing certified questions). But see, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“The [Virginia] Supreme
Court shall . . . have original jurisdiction . . . to answer questions of state law certified by a court
of the United States . . . .”).
156. James v. Bartlett, 607 S.E.2d 638, 641 (N.C. 2005).
157. On the other hand, because a trial court’s decision to certify precedes any decision on
the merits, the North Carolina Supreme Court might hold that that a trial court’s decision to
certify is insufficient to allow review. If the North Carolina Supreme Court so holds,
certification should still be possible from appellate courts. Cf., e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:72.1 (2007) (allowing certification only from appellate courts); LA. SUP. CT. R. XII (same).
An appellate court can only certify after the trial court’s decision on the merits; the North
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of law or legal inference” the North Carolina Supreme Court should
hold that it may answer certified questions.
3. Constitutional Design and the General Court’s Structure.
Furthermore, the North Carolina Constitution’s design and the
structure of the General Court of Justice indicate that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has jurisdiction to answer certified
questions. First, the North Carolina Constitution grants the supreme
court “general supervision and control” over the General Court of
158
Justice. The supreme court superintends the courts below with
appellate jurisdiction over decisions on any legal matter and the
159
power to issue writs affecting their proceedings. It further controls
these proceedings during the appellate process via its rulemaking
160
authority. These clauses envision a supreme court occupied by
questions of law, aiming toward general judicial control of all law
produced by courts within the state.
Certification respects this constitutional design. It asks the North
Carolina Supreme Court to do only what it is in the very business of
doing: resolving, in its discretion, questions of state law that arise out
of cases or controversies in inferior courts. Like the power to issue
writs, certification aims to reinforce the supreme court’s supervisory
control over all law produced by the courts within the state.
Moreover, it provides this service in situations—federal court cases—
in which state law applies but appellate review is not available. In
these situations, certification furthers the North Carolina
Constitution’s goals by providing a second-best supervisory
opportunity.
Second, the structure of the General Court of Justice indicates
that the North Carolina Supreme Court is vested with the power to

Carolina Supreme Court could review the trial court’s decision. To analogize to existing law, the
supreme court has discretion to review a case before it has been determined by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31 (West 2007) (allowing for
supreme court review “either before or after [the claim] has been determined by the Court of
Appeals”). A question certified from a federal appellate court before it determines the claim’s
merits should likewise be reviewable. If necessary, the certification procedure can reflect the
foregoing concerns by allowing only appellate courts to certify.
158. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“[T]he Court may issue any remedial writs necessary to
give it general supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts.”).
159. Id.
160. See id. art. IV, § 13(2) (defining the supreme court’s rulemaking authority).
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hear certified questions. The North Carolina Constitution vests all of
161
the relevant judicial power in the General Court of Justice, a
162
“unified judicial system” within the state. As the court of last resort
in the General Court, only the North Carolina Supreme Court can
163
render definitive interpretations of state law. It is just such a
definitive interpretation of state law that a court requests when
certifying a question. A certifying court therefore asks for an exercise
of judicial power that only the North Carolina Supreme Court can
perform. Since all of the relevant judicial power is vested in the
General Court, and since the North Carolina Supreme Court is the
only court within the General Court that could exercise this aspect of
that power, by process of elimination the North Carolina Supreme
Court must be the court vested with the power to answer certified
164
questions.
In re Martin suggests that these institutional-competence
considerations are appropriate when determining the proper venue
for a new procedure. In Martin, because of the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s general supervisory control over the state courts,
the General Assembly could establish it as the reviewing court for a
165
removal procedure for incapacitated judges. Similarly, the North
Carolina Supreme Court’s general supervisory authority over state
courts and its sole ability to issue definitive state law rulings make it
the appropriate court to answer certified questions.
4. Separation of Powers Does Not Apply. Finally, the policies
behind the precedent limiting the General Assembly’s power to
expand the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction do not apply
to certification. In both Smith and Old Fort, the North Carolina

161. The North Carolina Constitution vests the state’s judicial power in three loci: the
General Court of Justice, the Court for the Trial of Impeachments, and administrative agencies.
See id. art. IV, §§ 1, 3. Certification, which involves neither impeachment nor administrative
hearings, implicates only the General Court of Justice’s power.
162. Id. art. IV, § 2.
163. See Nash, supra note 47, at 1698 (“[T]he state’s highest court [is] the only court capable
of rendering a ‘definitive’ statement of state law under Erie and its progeny . . . .”).
164. A counterargument could be that the power to answer certified questions is not part of
“the judicial power” vested in the General Court of Justice at all. This argument misses the
point that answering certified questions—that is, deciding state law questions arising from
justiciable cases—is quintessentially judicial. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
165. In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (N.C. 1978).
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Supreme Court struck down statutes providing for proceedings in the
166
supreme court as a matter of right. Theoretically, if the General
Assembly could propagate mandatory appeals by the thousands, the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s constitutional duty to supervise the
lower courts (and its ability to judicially review statutes) would be
diluted out of existence. In that sense, enlarging the supreme court’s
jurisdiction
implicates
separation-of-powers
concerns.
But
167
certification is discretionary, and so poses no dilution problem.
Certification’s goal—to preserve the integrity of state law in a federal
system—has nothing to do with one part of the state government
encroaching on the province of another. For this reason, if no other,
the North Carolina Supreme Court should hold that it has jurisdiction
to answer certified questions.
If the supreme court has such jurisdiction, the General Assembly
can enact a certification statute—for it will not be enlarging the
supreme court’s jurisdiction—or the supreme court can adopt a rule
168
169
on its own motion. A version of the 1995 Uniform Law, with
which many courts across the nation are familiar, would work well.
The procedure should also incorporate the three recommendations
described in Part I.C: the law should be tailored to require (1) that the
North Carolina Supreme Court accept a question within, say, thirty
days or else the question shall be rejected by default; (2) that the
North Carolina Supreme Court answer or decline to answer questions
by written memorandum, setting forth the question certified and the
reason(s) for (non)acceptance; and (3) that the answer to a certified
question shall be res judicata to the parties, have the force and effect
of other decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court, and be

166. The statute struck down in Smith granted the N.C. Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over claims against the state. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976). The statute struck
down in Old Fort created a direct appeal from the N.C. Utilities Commission to the N.C.
Supreme Court. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8, 9
(N.C. 1965). That appeal was by right. See 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws, c. 1165, § 1 (providing that the
direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court under Section 62-99 be taken in the same
manner as other appeals to North Carolina Superior Court).
167. If the separation-of-powers objection to certification is fear of an aggrandized supreme
court, it is even less troublesome. The procedure, if enacted by statute, can just as easily be
repealed by statute. The General Assembly will not really have yielded any power at all.
168. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (granting the supreme court appellate rulemaking
power).
169. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67 (1995).
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published in the same manner. These improvements will help realize
certification’s goals and avoid potential pitfalls.
B. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction:
Exercising Reserved Powers
Notwithstanding the previous Section’s reasoning, the North
Carolina Supreme Court may hold that it does not have jurisdiction to
answer certified questions. If it does so, a question arises as to
whether the supreme court can extend its own jurisdiction; this
170
inquiry returns to Smith’s constitution-as-limit argument. The North
Carolina Constitution does not mention answering certified
questions; therefore the power to provide for such a procedure must
171
have been reserved to the people. Usually, the General Assembly
172
exercises the people’s reserved powers, but separation-of-powers
concerns prevent the General Assembly doing so to enlarge the
173
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The inquiry need not
end there: because the power to answer certified questions is
174
quintessentially judicial, in other states adopting the constitution-as175
limit theory, the court has exercised the people’s reserved powers.
Like the highest courts in Florida, Idaho, and Minnesota, the North
Carolina Supreme Court could extend its jurisdiction to answering
176
certified questions from federal courts.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court believes this theory is
sound as to its jurisdiction, under the rulemaking power it can
probably adopt any sort of certification procedure it wishes. The
theory, though, can be sound only when answering certified questions

170. See supra Part II.B.
171. See State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989) (“All power which is
not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people . . . .”).
172. See id. (“[A]n act of the people through their representatives in the legislature is valid
unless prohibited by that Constitution.” (emphasis added)).
173. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976) (“[T]he General Assembly [is]
without authority to expand the . . . jurisdiction of this Court beyond the limits set in the
Constitution.”); see also supra Part II.B.
174. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147–48
(Idaho 1983) (interpreting the Idaho Supreme Court’s jurisdictional clause as a limitation, not a
grant, and holding that the court had inherent judicial power to create a certification
procedure).
176. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–42 & nn.139–40 (citing examples from these states).
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remains within the judicial power. The procedure described at the
conclusion of Section A firmly roots certification within that power by
avoiding advisory opinions and properly limiting certification’s
177
scope. The North Carolina Supreme Court could adopt it.
Realistically, however, the supreme court is unlikely to hold that
it may validly exercise the people’s reserved powers. The enunciation
of the constitution-as-limit theory in North Carolina has always
178
granted that right to the General Assembly alone. More broadly,
the potential ramifications of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
exercise of the people’s reserved powers would be frightening. If that
court may extend its jurisdiction under this theory provided that its
activities remain “quintessentially judicial,” could the governor
exercise the people’s reserved powers so long as the governor’s
activities remained “quintessentially executive”? This theory would
countenance plenary power in ways that seem foreign to the
American understanding of government. More likely, the right to
exercise the people’s reserved power is the exclusive prerogative of
the General Assembly, where such acts are subject to the safeguards
179
180
of bicameralism and presentment.
C. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction:
Answering Without Exercising Jurisdiction
The North Carolina Supreme Court could also implement
certification under the Oklahoma and Ohio Supreme Courts’ view
that no exercise of jurisdiction is required to answer a certified
181
question. The Ohio Supreme Court, like the North Carolina

177. See supra Parts I.C, III.A; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 602 (N.C. 1906) (“[S]tate Constitutions are not to
be construed as grants of power . . . but rather as limitations upon the power of the state
Legislature.” (emphasis added) (quoting BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS § 100)); accord State
ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989) (“All power which is not expressly
limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the
people through their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that
Constitution.” (emphasis added)).
179. See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1 (dividing the General Assembly into two legislative bodies).
180. See id. art. II § 22(1) (permitting gubernatorial veto).
181. See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the
Ohio Supreme Court “need[s] no grant of jurisdiction in order to answer certified questions”
because that power “exists by virtue of Ohio’s very existence as a state in our federal system”);
Bonner v. Okla. Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1178 n.3 (Okla. 1993) (“This court needs no explicit
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Supreme Court, would strike down any statute purporting to extend
182
its constitutional jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme
Court allows certification because it does not consider its answer to
be an exercise of jurisdiction: although the Ohio Supreme Court’s
answer affects the case before the certifying court, the latter court
183
alone ultimately decides the case. The Ohio Supreme Court instead
grounds its power to answer in the structure of the U.S. Constitution
as reflected in Erie:
[T]he Ohio Constitution permits the state to exercise its own
sovereignty as far as the United States Constitution and laws permit.
Since federal law recognizes Ohio’s sovereignty by making Ohio law
applicable in federal courts, the state has the power to exercise and
the responsibility to protect that sovereignty. Therefore, if
answering certified questions serves to further the state’s interests
and preserve the state’s sovereignty, the appropriate branch of state
184
government—this court—may constitutionally answer them.

A certification rule under Ohio’s theory could be much broader
in scope than the Uniform Rule. For example, an advisory opinion
could conceivably “further the state’s interests and preserve the
185
state’s sovereignty,” so the requirement that the certified question
be determinative would be unnecessary. The North Carolina Supreme
Court should therefore be skeptical of the Ohio court’s reasoning: the
North Carolina Supreme Court cannot constitutionally issue advisory
186
opinions. But, advisory opinions are generally prohibited in Ohio as
187
well. Presumably, the North Carolina Supreme Court could adopt a
certification rule under Ohio’s theory if the rule did not permit
advisory opinions. The procedure recommended at the conclusion of

grant of jurisdiction to answer certified questions from a federal court; such power comes from
the United States Constitution’s grant of state sovereignty.”).
182. See Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079 (“[N]either statute nor rule of court can expand our
jurisdiction beyond the constitutional grant. If [the certification rule] expanded our jurisdiction,
we would have to declare it unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1079–80.
185. Id.
186. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (N.C. 1985) (“The North Carolina
Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions.”).
187. See State ex rel. Todd. v. Felger, 877 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 2007) (“[O]ur general rule
[is] that we will not issue advisory opinions . . . .”).
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Section A incorporates a determinativity requirement,
189
advisory opinions.

101

which avoids

D. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction:
Constitutional Amendment
As a final measure, the General Assembly could amend the
190
North Carolina Constitution to permit certification.
The last
sentence of the supreme court’s jurisdictional clause could be
amended:
The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to decide, when authorized
by law, the following:
(a) Direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North
Carolina Utilities Commission, and
(b) At the Supreme Court’s discretion, questions of North
191
Carolina law certified from courts of other jurisdictions.

This amendment would allow the North Carolina Supreme Court the
discretion to hear certified questions while affording the General
Assembly some influence over the process. Just as it may establish the
192
criteria for discretionary appeals, the General Assembly could
193
establish acceptance criteria for certified questions. If the proposed
amendment passes, the General Assembly should adopt the version
194
of the Uniform Law described at the conclusion of Section III.A. By

188. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67, 73 (1995) (“The
[Supreme Court] of this State may answer questions of law certified to it . . . which may be
determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court . . . .”).
189. For a description of how determinativity avoids advisory opinions, see supra Part II.A.
190. See In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766, 770–71 (N.C. 1978) (allowing the General Assembly to
create a new appeal to the supreme court because of an authorizing constitutional amendment).
191. Cf. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (“The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to review,
when authorized by law, direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission.”).
192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31(b) (West 2007) (permitting the supreme court to
review decisions of significant public interest or legal significance or that conflict with its
precedent).
193. The North Carolina Supreme Court would retain control over certification’s procedural
aspects. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (granting the North Carolina Supreme Court appellate
rulemaking power).
194. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67 (1995).
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maximizing certification’s benefits and minimizing its costs, this
procedure will serve judicial economy, preserve the integrity of state
law in our federal system, and inspire us to a divine comity.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina is the only state never to have enacted a
certification procedure. Previous calls for certification’s adoption in
this state, notably Professor Smith’s in 1999, have been unsuccessful,
perhaps because the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional
precedent seems to undercut certification’s constitutionality.
Reexamined in light of the North Carolina Constitution’s design and
the structure of the General Court of Justice, however, this precedent
does not render certification unconstitutional. Even if the North
Carolina Supreme Court holds to the contrary, certification could be
adopted under a theory that answering certified questions does not
require an exercise of jurisdiction or by constitutional amendment.
North Carolina therefore can and should adopt certification.
Such a procedure will avoid federal court guesswork on difficult state
law issues, ensuring fairness for the litigants while saving time and
money for future parties and the North Carolina courts.
Certification’s potential pitfalls can be circumvented through careful
drafting and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of
discretion: that court should decline to answer cases that fail to meet
certification’s requirements or serve state interests. With these
principles of judicial economy, comity, and federalism in mind, North
Carolina should at last join the rest of the union in adopting
certification.

